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I. Introduction
Franchises are a common feature of the business landscape. This article
explores the question of when a franchisor should be liable vicariously or directly
for torts arising in a franchised enterprise. In doing so, it addresses serious and
unsettled issues of tort and agency law and questions judicial fact finding in cases
with summary judgments favorable to franchisors.

* Professor and Kepler Chair in Law and Leadership Emeritus, University of Wyoming
College of Law; B.A. 1957, Harvard College; J.D. 1960, Harvard Law School. The author
appreciates the generous support from the Kepler Chair in Law and Leadership Fund in sponsoring
summer grants and student assistants for this article. The author thanks Kala Geanetta, Stephanie
Holguin, Kimberly Ingelhart, Richard McKinnon, and Shannon Rogers for their outstanding work
as student research assistants. The author also thanks his son, Attorney James M. Gelb, for once
again contributing excellent and creative editing assistance.
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The fundamental question of who is responsible for tort injuries as a matter of
law and as a matter of fact is recurrent and often difficult. There is, of course, the
general legal principle that the person who commits a tort should be responsible
to the victim for damages. Beyond that are principles of respondeat superior
that establish employer responsibility for employee torts committed within the
scope of employment. There is sometimes responsibility for persons even when
they engage non-employees to perform certain tasks.1 In addition, to encourage
investment, the law provides limited liability for persons who pursue business
in prescribed forms like corporations, limited liability companies or limited
liability partnerships.2
The ways in which persons organize to further their enterprises are often
complex. They may use several entities and types of entities. The enterprise may
have parents, subsidiaries and other affiliates. They may use non-employee agents,
employees and independent contractors. They may also utilize franchisees. As
a general proposition, one can safely assume that franchisors wish to preserve
limited liability for themselves and various components of their business and that
they prefer to be shielded from franchisee torts. It is very doubtful that customers
of franchised establishments give thought to such matters and if they did there
would be technical, informational, and time constraints which would often render
futile their search for “who am I really buying this sandwich from” or “who may
be liable if I am injured eating it.” Quite likely, it is often the magnetic pull of
a well-known and well advertised franchise name which has drawn customers to
an establishment.
In the context of this article, vicarious liability involves franchisor
responsibility for tort liability of the franchisee and direct liability involves
franchisor responsibility for its own torts. Although the term franchising may be
used to label a variety of relationships, the following description set forth by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kerl v. Rasmussen is adequate for this article:
A franchise is a business format typically characterized by
the franchisee’s operation of an independent business pursuant
to a license to use the franchisor’s trademark or trade name. A
franchise is ordinarily operated in accordance with a detailed
franchise or license agreement designed to protect the integrity
of the trademark by setting uniform quality, marketing, and
operational standards applicable to the franchise.3
1
See discussion infra Section IV (discussing the impact of the Restatement of Torts on
vicarious liability).
2
This form of limited liability, in the case of non-publicly owned entities, is subject to
challenge under “piercing the veil” doctrines. See generally Harvey Gelb, Limited Liability Policy and
Veil Piercing, 9 Wyo. L. Rev. 551 (2009).
3

Kerl v. Rasmussen, 682 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Wis. 2004).
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The degree and scope of franchisee independence from the franchisor as well
as a customer’s perception of whose business is being patronized often present
key legal and factual questions when dealing with summary judgment motions
regarding vicarious liability claims.
Not surprisingly, courts often look to agency law for analogy and guidance in
determining franchisor vicarious liability. Agency doctrines have long dealt with
the principles and policies of vicarious liability of employers (masters) under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the torts of employees (servants) committed
within the scope of their employment as well as for such liability arising from
claims of apparent agency or estoppel.
The following three sections of this article discuss franchisor vicarious
liability for franchisee torts from several perspectives. Section II focuses on the use
of principles of respondeat superior. Section III deals with apparent agency and
estoppel. Section IV considers the impact of the Restatement of Torts on vicarious
liability. Additionally, Section V deals with the direct liability of the franchisor for
its own torts related to the franchised business.
At the outset, it is important to note a factor complicating the consideration
of agency principles, the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Agency. In 2006, the
influential American Law Institute adopted the Restatement (Third) of the Law
of Agency with changes in terminology and otherwise from its predecessor. In
reading cases and other materials involving agency principles, awareness of these
changes and considerations of the complications caused may prove important.

II. Respondeat Superior and Franchisor Liability
Under the well-established principle of respondeat superior, “[a]n employer
is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the
scope of their employment.” 4 The Restatement (Third) of Agency defines the
term “employee” as “an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control
the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work.” 5 Obviously, this
definition requires that one be an “agent” as a prerequisite to being classified as
an “employee.” As defined by the Restatement (Third) of Agency, “[a]gency is
the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests
assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s
behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or
otherwise consents so to act.” 6 A plain reading of these Restatement sections
demonstrates that the degree of control over the performance of work distinguishes
a nonemployee from an employee agent.
4

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04 (2006). See also id. § 7.07(1).

5

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).

6

Id. § 1.01.
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At times, the franchise label may be applied to relationships that are
so constituted that the franchisor really is an employer and the franchisee an
employee. In such cases, the vicarious liability of the franchisor for the torts of the
franchisee can be resolved under the traditional agency law doctrine of respondeat
superior. However, many franchise relationships do not meet the technical
requirements that would establish an employer-employee relationship and are not
truly governed as to vicarious liability by the literal terms of respondeat superior.
For example, under the Restatement (Third) of Agency definitions cited above, an
employee must be an agent, and agency involves a fiduciary relationship between
the agent and the principal in which the former is to act on behalf of the latter. 7
It is unlikely that the typical relationship of a franchisee to a franchisor involves a
fiduciary duty from one to the other or that the “on behalf of ” element is present.
Furthermore, when analyzing vicarious liability agency doctrines, one must
be mindful of variations in terminology. While under the latest Restatement
(Third) of Agency, the principal-agent relationship is also considered and labeled
as an employer-employee relationship when the principal’s control over the agent
attains the prescribed higher level of control over the work,8 the previous label
for such a relationship was master-servant.9 Use of the terms “employer” and
“employee” represents a deliberate effort in the Restatement (Third) of Agency
to substitute those words for outdated master-servant terminology.10 Vicarious
liability principles are applicable to what this Restatement (Third) of Agency calls
employer-employee relationships.
Along similar lines, it should be noted that courts have not always been
careful in using terminology in traditional Restatement ways. Occasionally courts
may use the term “agent” when it would be more appropriate to use “servant”
or “employee.”11
Readers of cases and other materials need to be conscious of possible variations
in terminology. Some courts analyze the vicarious liability of franchisors as if
ordinary agency rules govern without mentioning that the value of such rules
often exists only because of the analogous light they may shed. Others recognize
the uniqueness of many franchise relationships but consciously borrow from
respondeat superior vicarious liability concepts and particularly the control factor
inherent in such concepts in deciding franchisor liability issues.

7

Id.

8

See id. § 7.07(1).

9

See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2 (1958).

10

Restatement (Third) of Agency intro. (2006).

11

See generally Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196 (Del. 1978).
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For example, in Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., a case involving a claim against
a franchisor arising from an injury incurred from biting into a sandwich, the
court spoke in terms of an actual agency relationship, stating, “[t]he kind of
actual agency relationship that would make defendant vicariously liable for 3K’s
negligence requires that defendant have the right to control the method by which
3K performed its obligations under the Agreement. The common context for
that test is a normal master-servant (or employer-employee) relationship.”12
Significantly, the court noted that a relationship between two business entities is
not precisely an employment relationship but still applied the right to control test
in the franchisee context.13
Also the Delaware Supreme Court, in Billops v. Magness Construction Co.,
quoted agency terminology but without using the narrower and more traditional
servant-agent (or employee-agent) terminology involved in respondeat superior
vicarious liability, saying “[i]f, in practical effect, the franchise agreement goes
beyond the stage of setting standards, and allocates to the franchisor the right
to exercise control over the daily operations of the franchise, an agency relationship exists.”14
On the other hand, there are courts which have explicitly stated that suits
against franchisors require a different approach than employer vicarious liability
suits.15 In two important cases, the highest courts of both Wisconsin and Maine
referred to franchisor vicarious liability cases as being of first impression but drew
from agency law control principles in resolving, albeit differently, what the law
should be.16
In Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that, while a guest at a
Holiday Inn motel, she slipped and fell on an area of walkway where water draining
from an air conditioner had been allowed to accumulate.17 She sought damages
from the defendant, Holiday Inns, Inc. (Holiday), arguing that “[Holiday], its
agents and employees . . . carelessly, recklessly, and negligently maintained the
premises of the motel.”18 Holiday filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
its only relationship with the operator of the motel was a license agreement
permitting the operator to use the name “Holiday Inns.”19 The trial court granted

12

945 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).

13

Id.

14

391 A.2d at 197–98.

See Rainey v. Langen, 998 A.2d 342 (Me. 2010); Kerl v. Rasmussen, 682 N.W.2d 328
(Wis. 2004).
15

16

Rainey, 998 A.2d at 346–47; Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 337.

17

219 S.E.2d 874, 875 (Va. 1975).

18

Id.

19

Id.
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Holiday’s motion, finding that Holiday did not own the motel premises and that
no principal-agent or master-servant relationship existed between Holiday and
the licensee corporation, Betsy-Len Motor Corporation (Betsy-Len).20
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether Holiday and
Betsy-Len had an “agency relationship.”21 The court stated, “[t]he fact that an
agreement is a franchise contract does not insulate contracting parties from an
agency relationship,”22 and, “[i]f a franchise contract ‘so regulates the activities
of the franchisee’ as to vest the franchisor with control within the definition of
agency, the agency relationship arises even though the parties expressly deny it.”23
The court then examined the regulatory provisions in the franchise agreement
between Holiday and Betsy-Len:
[T]he purpose of those provisions was to achieve system-wide
standardization of business identity, uniformity of commercial
service, and optimum public good will . . . . The regulatory
provisions did not give [Holiday] control over the day-to-day
operation of Betsy-Len’s motel. While [Holiday] was empowered
to regulate the architectural style of the buildings and the type
and style of furnishings and equipment, [Holiday] was given no
power to control daily maintenance of the premises. [Holiday]
was given no power to control Betsy-Len’s current business
expenditures, fix customer rates, or demand a share of the
profits. [Holiday] was given no power to hire or fire Betsy-Len’s
employees, determine employee wages or working conditions,
set standards for employee skills or productivity, supervise
employee work routine, or discipline employees for nonfeasance
or misfeasance. All such powers and other management controls
and responsibilities customarily exercised by an owner and
operator of an on-going business were retained by Betsy-Len.24
Based on this analysis, the court held that the franchise agreement did not give
Holiday “control or right to control the method or details of doing the work” and
that “no principal-agent or masterservant [sic] relationship was created.”25

20

See id.

21

See id. at 877.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 878.

25

Id. at 877.
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The court’s reference to “control” illustrates the terminological confusion
referenced earlier.26 Though the court ostensibly considered whether the parties
had an “agency relationship”27 and ultimately held “that the regulatory provisions
of the franchise contract did not constitute control within the definition of
agency,”28 the court’s analysis (quoted above) would have been better directed
to the question of control sufficient to establish a master-servant relationship.
The court may have been uneasy about its use of terminology, accompanying its
statement that “no principal-agent or masterservant [sic] relationship was created”
with a footnote in which it stated: “Because [Holiday] had no such control or
right to control, the distinction between a principal-agent and a master-servant
relationship is not relevant here.”29 This footnote hardly clarifies the matter. The
court concluded that the regulatory provisions of the franchise contract did not
constitute control within the definition of agency thus evidencing the same kind
of terminological confusion earlier mentioned.30
In a leading Wisconsin case, Kerl v. Rasmussen, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld a summary judgment ruling favoring the franchisor in a franchisor vicarious
liability suit. 31 In Kerl, a work-release inmate employed at an Arby’s restaurant
operated by Dennis Rasmussen, Inc. (DRI) left work without permission, shot
two persons, then killed himself.32 The plaintiffs, including the guardian of the first
victim and the estate of the second, sued Arby’s and DRI on several grounds and
argued, among other things, that Arby’s was vicariously liable for DRI’s negligent
supervision of its employee.33 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Arby’s on the ground there was no basis for vicarious liability.34 On appeal, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment.35
Kerl contains a detailed discussion of franchisor vicarious liability for
franchisee torts.36 Although the court did not purport to decide the matter as an
agency law issue, it analyzed agency law vicarious liability principles in arriving at
its decision.37 The lone issue before the court on appeal was that of Arby’s vicarious

26

See supra text accompanying notes 8–14.

27

Murphy, 219 S.E.2d at 876.

28

Id. at 878.

29

Id. at 877 & n.2.

30

Id. at 878.

31

682 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Wis. 2004).

32

Id.

33

Id. at 331–33.

34

Id. at 331.

35

Id. at 332.

36

See id. at 337–41.

37

See id.
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liability as franchisor for DRI’s alleged negligent supervision of its employees.38
Considering the issue as one of first impression in Wisconsin, the intermediate
court of appeals had “surveyed case law from other jurisdictions and concluded
that the prevailing standard for franchisor vicarious liability focuses on whether
the franchisor controls the ‘specific instrumentality’ which allegedly caused the
harm, or whether the franchisor has a right of control over the alleged negligent
activity.”39 The court explained that “‘[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior,
a master is subject to liability for the tortious acts of his or her servant’”40 and that
“[t]he master/servant relationship is a species of agency [and] that all servants
are agents.”41 The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed, holding “that a franchisor
may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its franchisee only if the
franchisor has control or a right of control over the daily operation of the specific
aspect of the franchisee’s business that is alleged to have caused the harm.”42
Applying this rule, the court concluded the trial court had properly granted
summary judgment in favor of Arby’s because the license agreement did not give
Arby’s the right of control over DRI’s supervision of its employees even though it
“imposed many quality and operational standards on the franchise.”43
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Kerl, and the arguments it stated
in favor of its decision, indicate the court was determined to construe franchisor
vicarious liability for franchisee torts in a restrictive manner, and its approach
leaves summary judgment as a formidable weapon for franchisor defendants.44 To
begin with, the predisposition of the court in favor of summary judgment for the
franchisor is plainly illustrated by this statement:
If the operational standards included in the typical franchise
agreement for the protection of the franchisor’s trademark were
broadly construed as capable of meeting the “control or right
to control” test that is generally used to determine respondeat
superior liability, then franchisors would almost always be
exposed to vicarious liability for the torts of their franchisees. We
see no justification for such a broad rule of franchisor vicarious
liability. If vicarious liability is to be imposed against franchisors,
a more precisely focused test is required.45

38

Id. at 331.

39

Id. at 333.

40

Id. at 334 (quoting Pamperin v. Trinity Mem’l Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 848, 852 (Wis. 1988)).

41

Id.

42

Id. at 341.

43

Id. at 332.

44

See id.

45

Id. at 331–32.
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Secondly, without reference to any survey or study the court arrived at the
somewhat astounding conclusion “that the marketing, quality, and operational
standards commonly found in franchise agreements are insufficient to establish
the close supervisory control or right of control necessary to demonstrate the
existence of a master/servant relationship for all purposes or as a general matter.”46
The court’s willingness to generalize about franchise agreements in order to create
a restrictive vicarious liability approach in favor of franchisors is inappropriately
speculative. Courts should examine the terms of such agreements on a case by
case basis rather than trumpeting a purported commonly found standard that,
unfortunately, may be echoed by other courts who repeat it as a truth revealed
by a respected sister court. Nor should the temptation to walk the short and easy
road to summary judgment, in preference to the more grueling path of a trial, be
allowed to engender conclusory presumptions against plaintiffs.
Additionally, the Kerl opinion did not deal with the realities of the control
relationship between a franchisor and franchisee. It may be that this question was
not raised.47 Evidence of such realities may demonstrate a level of control by the
franchisor far greater than the documents indicate. De facto control may arise in
some situations from franchisee reluctance to defy franchisor recommendations.
Nor should courts casually toss aside franchisor powers of inspection or termination
as irrelevant to control determinations. Indeed, in some cases realistic control
determinations may best be made after trial testimony, however inconvenient that
may seem to proponents of summary judgments. The question of the presence
of de facto control of the franchisor, even where it does not arise from franchise
documents, would preclude summary judgments in some cases.48 Additionally
the question of franchisor liability for its behavior or exercise of power may raise
issues of its direct liability for injuries.49
The Kerl case raised a number of policy considerations in dealing with
franchisor vicarious liability that shed light on its ruling:
1. There is a modern consensus justifying vicarious liability “on common
law policy grounds as a device for spreading risk and encouraging
safety and the exercise of due care by employees/servants.”50 The court

46

Id. at 332.

47

See id.

See Hoover v. Sun Oil Co., 212 A.2d 214, 216 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965) (“However, the
lease contract and dealer’s agreement fail to establish any relationship other than landlord-tenant,
and independent contractor. Nor is there anything in the conduct of the individuals which is
inconsistent with that relationship so as to indicate that the contracts were mere subterfuge
or sham.”).
48

49

See discussion infra Section V.

50

Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 336.
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explained that exposure to vicarious liability creates an incentive for
masters to properly control the conduct of their servants so as to
ensure that they will exercise due care in carrying out the master’s
business; that employees are less responsive to the threat of tort
liability than employers because the former usually are less able to
satisfy judgments for damages; and that employers are usually better
able financially to absorb the costs of supervision and safety measures
or to insure against the risk.51
2. Admitting the rationale for vicarious liability has expanded and its
application has become more diverse, the court still stated “only a
‘master’ who has the requisite degree of control or right of control
over the physical conduct of a servant in the performance of the
master’s business will be held vicariously liable.”52 Absent such a
control element, the court felt the opportunity and incentive to
promote safety and the exercise of due care are not present and
imposing liability without fault would be difficult to justify on
such grounds.53
3. Positing that a franchisor’s control does not extend to “routine,
daily supervision and management” but is limited to “contractual
quality and operational requirements necessary to the integrity of
the franchisor’s trade or service mark,” the court stated that “[t]he
perceived fairness of requiring a principal who closely controls the
physical conduct of an agent to answer for the harm caused by the
agent is diminished in this context.”54 The court also stated that
encouraging safety and the exercise of due care has less strength
as a justification for imposing no fault liability on a franchisor.55
The court concluded that the clear trend in the case law of other
jurisdictions is that quality and operational standards and inspection
rights contained in a franchise agreement do not establish the
requisite control or right of control for vicarious liability as a general
matter for all purposes.56
4. The court identified a variety of franchising forms including
product franchises, business format franchises, and certain kinds
of dealerships, and specifically pointed to the form of franchising

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 336–37.

54

Id. at 338.

55

Id.

56

Id.
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before it, under which there is a sale of a product or service under the
franchisor’s trademark pursuant to specified quality, marketing and
operational standards.57 The court noted among other things that
“[t]he franchise arrangement enables the franchisor to reach new, farflung markets without having to directly manage a vast network of
individual outlets.”58 Perhaps the court here was implicitly displaying
approval of franchising as a way of doing business and its reluctance to encumber franchisors with responsibility for accidents or
their prevention.
5. The court stated that, generally, the justifications for vicarious
liability are lost in the franchising context and the control or right to
control test is not easily transferable to the franchise relationship.59
Referring to the detailed requirements of franchise agreements with
respect to franchisee operations, the court said, “existence of these
contractual requirements does not mean franchisors have a role in
managing the day-to-day operations of their franchisees.”60 Indeed,
the court unconvincingly stretched the point to say “imposition of
quality and operational requirements by contract suggests that the
franchisor does not intervene in the daily operation and management
of the independent business of the franchisee.”61
6. Alluding to the detailed quality and operational standards and
inspection rights in a franchise agreement as integral to the protection
of the franchisor’s trade or service mark under the Lanham Act,
the court said the purpose of the Act is to ensure the integrity of
registered trademarks and not to create a federal law of agency which
automatically saddles the licensor with responsibilities under state
law of a principal.62
57

Id. at 337.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 338.

61

Id.

Id. (citing Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1979)). The federal
Lanham Act, title 15, chapter 22 of the United States Code, codified much of traditional trademark
infringement law and “broadly prohibits uses of trademarks, trade names, and trade dress that are
likely to cause confusion about the source of a product or service.” 87 C.J.S. Trademarks, Etc. § 81
(2012). In Oberlin, the Seventh Circuit observed that “[t]he Lanham Act requires supervision of
trademark licensees at the expense of abandonment of the trademark. The licensor must control
the operations of its licensees to ensure that the trademark is not used to deceive the public as to
the quality of the goods or services bearing the name.” 596 F.2d at 1327. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1055
(2012) (“Where a registered mark . . . is or may be used legitimately by related companies, . . . such
use shall not affect the validity of such mark or of its registration, provided such mark is not used in
such manner as to deceive the public.”).
62
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The policy analysis of the Kerl court is open, at the least, to the following challenges:
1. The Kerl court’s use of sweeping generalizations about franchisors’
lack of control may undermine careful case-by-case fact finding about
control, thereby eliminating the opportunity to advance policies
of safety and care that trigger respondeat superior liability. Indeed
franchisors, even if not technically employers, may be in a better
position than some employers in the same type of business to know
about the risks and perils of the business through their wide ranging
experience and education acquired both independently and through
their franchised locations. Franchisors with such informational
assets should share them with franchisees and advance goals of safety
and care.
2. It will often behoove franchisors, as a matter of good business policy
and not just to avoid liability, to require franchisees to promote safety
in their practices and environment. In addition, inspection powers
and activity enable franchisors to identify and hopefully deal with
safety concerns.
3. Franchisor responsibility for franchisee torts may assure a realistic
assessment of insurance needs and thus help to provide injured
persons with appropriate recoveries.
4. Reference by the court to Lanham Act requirements as some kind of
excuse or reason to protect franchisors from vicarious tort liability
resulting from franchisee behavior is inappropriate. Persons in
business may be subject to a variety of regulations causing the level
of control they exercise over employees or others to increase. Why
should Lanham Act requirements be construed in some perverse way
to undermine vicarious liability principles? 63
In Kerl the court struck a serious but unconvincing blow against plaintiffs
seeking fact finding through trials, both by its conclusory generalization regarding
standardized provisions of franchise agreements and its preconception that
franchisor liability should be narrowly circumscribed.64 The view of the court about

63

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

64

Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 341. The court said:
Consistent with the majority approach in other jurisdictions, we conclude that the
standardized provisions commonly included in franchise agreements specifying
uniform quality, marketing, and operational requirements and a right of inspection
do not establish a franchisor’s control or right to control the daily operations of the
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“standardized provisions commonly included” has been questioned. However,
the practical impact of the court’s holding, seemingly concerned with divided
operations in a franchise business, is harder to assess. In applying its principles
to the case before it, the court did review documents and stated that the license
agreement contained many general controls on the operation of the restaurant,
and required the franchisee to operate the business strictly in conformity with the
manual provided by Arby’s. The court also stated the provisions in the agreement
are consistent with quality and operational standards commonly contained
in franchise agreements to achieve marketing uniformity in products and to
protect the franchisor’s trademark, but insufficient to establish a master/servant
relationship or to establish that Arby’s controlled or had a right to control the
hiring and supervision of employees, which is the aspect of the business alleged
to have caused the plaintiff ’s harm.65 The court noted the agreement and manual
contained provisions for the franchisee to properly supervise qualified personnel
for the efficient operation of the business and that the manual provided guidelines
for hiring, training, and supervising employees.66 The court also noted that DRI
had sole control over the hiring and supervision of employees and Arby’s could not
step in and take over management of employees.67 Importantly, the court stated
that Arby’s right to terminate their relationship because of an uncured violation
of the agreement was not equivalent to a right to control daily operations of
the restaurant or to manage the workforce and that there was no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the franchisee was a servant for purposes of the
respondeat superior claim which it clearly was not.68 The court held Arby’s could
not be vicariously liable for the franchisee’s negligent supervision of the employee
whose actions directly caused the damages.69
However, Kerl, along with a number of other franchise cases, in their
preoccupation with franchise documents, do not get to the heart of the matter:
What is the reality in fact of the franchisor’s control? Furthermore, are there not
good policy reasons, considered earlier, to encourage a franchisor to use its power
to promote safety and care?70 Moreover, it is difficult to assess the true impact of

franchisee sufficient to give rise to vicarious liability for all purposes or as a general
matter. We hold that a franchisor may be held vicariously liable for the tortious
conduct of its franchisee only if the franchisor has control or a right of control over
the daily operation of the specific aspect of the franchisee’s business that is alleged to
have caused the harm.
Id.
65

Id. at 342.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

See supra text accompanying notes 62–63 (discussing policy reasons).
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a franchisor’s right to terminate a franchise without understanding the realities of
the relationship between franchisor and franchisee.
A properly analyzed vicarious liability case should take into account not
only the requirements of documents signed by the parties but also their de
facto relationship and their interpretation of, and actual practices under, those
documents. Parties should not be able to hide the realities of control behind the
words of documents. In addition, the impact of suggestions by the franchisor on
the franchisee’s conduct might be an issue best resolved by the ultimate fact finder,
such as a jury, and not by summary judgment. As a policy matter, why should a
franchisor with real power and expertise not be encouraged to try to prevent torts
that might result from the behavior of the employees of the franchisee?
In a 2010 decision, the Maine Supreme Court approved a partial summary
judgment in favor of Domino’s Pizza, LLC (Domino’s) against a claim of vicarious
liability stemming from injuries sustained by one of the plaintiffs who, while
riding his motorcycle, was seriously hurt in a collision with a vehicle driven
by an employee of a Domino’s franchisee.71 The court, recognizing the case of
franchisor liability as one of first impression in Maine, looked particularly to the
“right to control” test used to determine employer/employee relationships under
agency law, and saw such principles as applying with equal force in the franchisor/
franchisee context.72
The court pointed to two paths taken by other courts in determining
franchisor vicarious liability: application of the traditional “right to control” test
focusing on a franchisor’s control over a franchisee’s performance of its day-today operations; and an instrumentality rule, as in the Kerl case, holding that the
franchisor may be subject to vicarious liability for the tortious conduct of its
franchisee only if the franchisor had control or a right of control over the daily
operation of the specific aspect of the franchisee’s business that is alleged to have
caused the harm.73
The Maine court concluded that the traditional approach struck an
appropriate balance and declined to adopt the instrumentality rule, asserting
that “[t]he traditional test allows a franchisor to regulate the uniformity and
the standardization of products and services without risking the imposition of
vicarious liability.”74 As in Kerl, the court referred to Lanham Act considerations
to the effect that, “the duty [imposed by the Lanham Act] does not give a licensor
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Rainey v. Langen, 998 A.2d 342, 344 (Me. 2010).
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control over the day-to-day operations of a licensee beyond that necessary to
ensure uniform quality of the product or service in question.”75 The court further
said, “‘trademark license agreements do not in and of themselves create an agency
relationship,’” but that “[i]f a franchisor takes further measures to reserve control
over a franchisee’s performance of its day-to-day operations, . . . the franchisor
is no longer merely protecting its mark, and imposing vicarious liability may
be appropriate.”76
The Maine court reviewed documents applicable in the franchise relationship
at issue and notwithstanding Domino’s having the right to conduct inspections
and terminate the franchise relationship, notwithstanding a number of provisions
in the franchise agreement and guide dealing with delivery of customer orders
and safety of delivery drivers and vehicles, and notwithstanding the requirement
“that franchisees ‘strictly comply with all laws, regulations, and rules of the road
and due care and caution in the operation of delivery vehicles,’”77 concluded that
the controls contained/provided for in the documents fell short of control over
the performance of the franchisee’s day-to-day operations.78 In the concluding
paragraph of the opinion, the court, basing its determination on the agreement
and guide, stated that the franchisor did not retain sufficient control over the
franchisee to subject itself to vicarious liability.79 Therefore, the court held the
partial summary judgment was appropriate.80
Unfortunately, the court appears to have adopted a bias in its control
analysis favorable to franchisors by reference to the Lanham Act, which places
an affirmative duty upon a licensor of a registered trademark to take reasonable
measures to detect and prevent misleading uses of the mark by its licensees.81 The
court stated that to avoid noncompliance with the Lanham Act there must be
adequate licensor control over the use of its mark.82 The court’s view is that “the
control mandated by the Lanham Act was not intended to ‘saddle [a] licensor
with the responsibilities under state law of a principal for his agent’” and that “it is
necessary to evaluate the franchise relationship in light of the franchisor’s duty to
police its trademark.”83 Evidently, in support of its position, the court refers to a
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commentator noting “that extending vicarious liability could improperly penalize
a franchisor for exercising the degree of control necessary to protect the integrity
of its trademark.” 84 This attitude of immunizing control required by the Lanham
Act from being a ground for imposing responsibility for torts due to control
exercised or possessed by a franchisor is inappropriate and colors the views of the
court in a manner favorable to the franchisor without regard to the purposes of
tort law.85
In the final analysis, the Maine Supreme Court’s decision in Rainey reflects
many of the same analytical problems that were present in Kerl (discussed above).86
One obvious example is the Rainey court’s adoption of the Kerl court’s Lanham
Act argument, a questionable “follow the leader” approach.
More significantly, as in Kerl, the court in Rainey did not delve into the
question of whether the franchisor enjoyed or engaged in a reality of control that
was not evident from the franchise documents. As in Kerl, this may have been
because the plaintiffs did not raise the issue.
Would courts reject such an inquiry if evidence were properly presented?
Neither Rainey nor Kerl answers this question. In Allen v. Choice Hotels Inter
national, the Mississippi Court of Appeals seemed willing to include de facto
control within the scope of its inquiry, but pointed to the lack of sworn testimony
from plaintiffs challenging that of the franchisor on the matter.87 Unfortunately,
the Allen court also cited Kerl for the proposition that “the quality and operational
standards and inspection rights contained in a franchise agreement do not establish
a franchisor’s control or right to control over the franchise sufficient to ground a
claim for vicarious liability,” sadly illustrating how an inappropriate but seductive
view can become embedded in judicial repetitions as if it were based on some
established truths.88
In addition, the Allen court’s reliance on the franchisor’s failure to be
more forthcoming in furnishing safety standards to the franchisee as a point
against franchisor liability is troubling.89 Surely, those franchisors with much
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See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 50–61 and accompanying text.
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Id. The Allen action stemmed from the death of a man and injury to his wife resulting
from a struggle with robbers who had entered their hotel room. Id. The case against the franchisor
claimed that it failed to provide reasonable security to protect hotel guests. Id. The court referred to
some of Choice’s requirements about motel doors involving their width, their viewer, deadbolt lock,
and security bars but said:
89
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greater experience and information in a particular type of business should not
be discouraged from imposing safety measures in order to avoid liability based
on control.
In Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., a restaurant patron sought damages from
defendant McDonald’s Corporation for injuries suffered from biting into a heartshaped sapphire stone while eating a Big Mac sandwich.90 The trial court granted
summary judgment to defendant on the ground that the restaurant was owned
and operated by a franchisee and not the defendant franchisor.91
On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals recognized that even though the
relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee business entities was not
precisely an employment relationship, it “in common with most if not all other
courts that have considered the issue, has applied the right to control test for
vicarious liability in that context as well.” 92 The Oregon Court of Appeals adopted
a Delaware Supreme Court test: 93 “If, in practical effect, the franchise agreement
goes beyond the stage of setting standards, and allocates to the franchisor the
right to exercise control over the daily operations of the franchise, an agency
relationship exists.” 94
Referring to the franchisee as “3K” in the following passage, the Oregon court
explained that a jury could find the franchisor retained sufficient control over the
franchisee’s daily operations that an actual agency relationship existed:
[T]he Agreement did not simply set standards that 3K had to
meet. Rather, it required 3K to use the precise methods that
defendant established, both in the Agreement and in the detailed
manuals that the Agreement incorporated. Those methods
included the ways in which 3K was to handle and prepare food.
Defendant enforced the use of those methods by regularly sending

We are not persuaded that these requirements show enough control to shift
responsibility for safety to Choice. We note again that it is not only results that a
franchisor must control, but also the means to those ends. These few requirements
regarding hotel doors do not show that Choice had the right to control both the
means and the ends of security at the Comfort Inn.
Id. at 822.
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inspectors and by its retained power to cancel the Agreement.
That evidence would support a finding that defendant had the
right to control the way in which 3K performed at least food
handling and preparation. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges
that 3K’s deficiencies in those functions resulted in the sapphire
being in the Big Mac and thereby caused her injuries. Thus, . . .
there is evidence that defendant had the right to control 3K in
the precise part of its business that allegedly resulted in plaintiff ’s
injuries. That is sufficient to raise an issue of actual agency.95
Notably the above passage gives weight to the inspection and termination
enforcement powers of the franchisor. Additionally, the fact that food preparation
and safety must be of central concern to fast food franchisors may have made it
easier for the court to see the probability of intense franchisor interest in control
or a right to control franchisee behavior.
Perhaps other matters, such as control over premises safety, are less obvious
candidates for jury consideration than food preparation and handling. Still,
customer safety from the various hazards arising in the course of being patrons of
a franchised restaurant should be of great importance to a franchisor and worthy
of attention and control. Courts should be wary of illusions to the contrary that
lead to summary judgments.
For whatever reason, the Miller analysis is not encumbered by specious
arguments based on the Lanham Act that were discussed earlier.96 Nor does
the court make questionable assumptions about the actual control relationship
between the franchisor and franchisee, which would ease the way to a summary
judgment for the franchisor. A major difficulty in this area of the law is to
formulate and apply legal principles to encourage franchisors to help franchisees
achieve safety for customers. Franchisors have such strong business incentives to
encourage and insist upon safe practices by franchisees that it is hard to imagine
that in reality they are not doing so.

III. Apparent Agency and Estoppel
It is lunchtime and a driver is hungry. He sees a familiar sign along the
highway advertising a well-known fast food restaurant and he sees the signs of two
other restaurants unknown to him. Feeling safer with the familiar, he patronizes
the well-known place. He becomes ill from the food he eats and files suit against
the franchisor of the enterprise. The franchisor moves for summary judgment
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claiming it is not liable for the torts of the franchisee who owns and operates the
restaurant. Nor, it says, is it liable for the torts of the employees of that franchisee.
In the previous section, theories of franchisor liability based on the respondeat
superior doctrine or analogies to its principles were considered. This section
focuses on cases in which the question of franchisor liability for franchisee torts
is based on apparent authority (or apparent agency) principles and gives brief
consideration to liability based on estoppel.
In Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., discussed above, the Oregon Court of Appeals
used the Restatement (Second) of Agency, section 267 (Section 267) regarding
apparent agency in arriving at its decision.97 Section 267 states:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent
and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the
care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the
third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the
one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.98
The Miller court referred to cases in which courts found a jury issue on
apparent agency and stated that “[t]he crucial issues are whether the putative
principal held the third party out as an agent and whether the plaintiff relied
on that holding out.”99 The Miller court summarized these previous apparent
agency cases:
In each of these cases, the franchise agreement required the
franchisee to act in ways that identified it with the franchisor. The
franchisor imposed these requirements as part of maintaining
an image of uniformity of operations and appearance for the
franchisor’s entire system. Its purpose was to attract the patronage
of the public to that entire system. The centrally imposed
uniformity is the fundamental basis for the courts’ conclusion
that there was an issue of fact whether the franchisors held the
franchisees out as the franchisors’ agents.100
The Miller court pointed to the appearance and operation of the franchisee,
in the case under consideration, as identifying it with the franchisor (McDonald’s
Corporation) and the common image for all of the latter’s restaurants created
through national advertising, common signs and uniforms, common menus,
common appearance, and common standards.101 Regarding the possible existence
97
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of a sign in the restaurant identifying the franchisee as the operator, the court quite
wisely noted that fact issues remained as to “whether that sign was sufficiently
visible to the public . . . and . . . whether one sign by itself is sufficient to remove
the impression that [McDonald’s] created through all of the other indicia of its
control that it, and [the franchisee] . . . , presented to the public.”102
Noting the franchisor (McDonald’s Corporation) did not seriously dispute
that a jury could find it held the franchisee (3K) out as its agent, the court turned
to the franchisor’s argument that “there [was] insufficient evidence that plaintiff
justifiably relied on that holding out.”103 The plaintiff had taken the position that
she went to the franchisee’s (3K) restaurant because it was a McDonald’s restaurant,
but the franchisor contended she also had to prove that she went to it because she
believed McDonald’s Corporation operated both it and the other McDonald’s
restaurants she had previously patronized.104 The court wisely rejected that
standard, noting that it “demands a higher level of sophistication about the nature
of franchising than the general public can be expected to have and ignores the
effect of its own efforts to lead the public to believe that McDonald’s restaurants
are part of a uniform national system of restaurants with common products and
common standards of quality.”105 The court properly held it to be a jury question
as to whether the plaintiff “believed that all McDonald’s restaurants were the same
because she believed that one entity owned and operated all of them or, at the
least, exercised sufficient control that the standards that she experienced at one
would be the same as she experienced at others.”106

A. The Restatement (Third) of Agency and Section 267
There are cases in addition to Miller that accept the doctrine of apparent
agency as applicable to franchisor liability claims, and cases often cite Section 267
for apparent agency principles.
Before further discussion of the application of apparent agency principles by
courts, it is appropriate to consider the fate of Section 267 at the hands of the
adopters of Restatement (Third) of Agency. The Restatement (Third) of Agency
simply contains no section tracking Section 267. Whether the omission will
have much of an impact on judicial views of apparent agency remains to be seen.
However, for the reasons outlined below, the omission of Section 267 alone will
not easily destroy its precedential value.
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First, those courts that have adopted principles akin to those set forth in
Section 267 would need to be convinced that precedent should be overturned
or altered before they disavow any of those principles. Second, courts lacking
apparent agency precedent may be guided by principles of apparent agency derived
from Section 267 and adopted by courts of other jurisdictions if they find them
persuasive. Third, the absence of Section 267 language does not constitute in
itself a repudiation of the principles of that section. Fourth, Restatement (Third)
of Agency does not express hostility to the use of apparent agency principles
that have evolved. Fifth, even if such omission were interpreted as an implicit
repudiation of Section 267 in whole or in part, courts may choose to follow the
principles of Section 267 especially in light of existing case law. Sixth, arguably,
by omitting language tracking Section 267, Restatement (Third) of Agency is
sending no discernible message.
Seventh, potentially of considerable significance, there exists case law involving
hospital liability supporting the proposition that the omission of Section 267
language has opened the door wider to the trial of apparent agency actions in tort
cases. This case law looks to section 2.03 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency
(Section 2.03), as applicable in dealing with apparent authority claims.107

B. Restatement Guidance
Despite the fact that Restatement (Third) of Agency does not contain an
“apparent agency” section equivalent to section 267 of the Restatement (Second),
the Restatement (Third) of Agency nonetheless offers criteria applicable in making
an apparent agency determination. Although courts often accept apparent agency
as a basis for liability, some of them apply its principles so narrowly as to eliminate
claims against franchisors for franchisee torts.108 Assuming that courts continue to
accept apparent agency principles, appropriate guidance for making an apparent
agency determination may be found in Restatement (Third) of Agency. This
would be so unless, as seems unlikely, silence is construed as a repudiation of the
principles of Section 267 and guidance from the Restatement (Third) of Agency
or its comments on the meaning or application of apparent agency principles is
deemed to be inappropriate in franchise cases.
To begin with, it is reasonable to assume that criteria for what is labeled
as apparent authority should apply as well to apparent agency determinations
from Restatement (Third) of Agency. Aside from the logical support for such an
approach, comment b to Section 2.03 states, “[m]any judicial opinions use the

107
See generally Jones v. Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 206 P.3d 473 (Idaho 2009);
Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hosp., 958 A.2d 101 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); discussion infra
accompanying notes 174–92.
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terms ‘apparent agency’ and ‘apparent authority’ interchangeably.”109 Additionally,
as indicated below, there is already case law supporting this approach in hospital
liability cases.110
Section 2.03 and its comments afford useful guidance in interpreting apparent
authority or apparent agency. For examples of such guidance from Restatement
(Third) of Agency, consider the following:
1. Section 2.03 states: “[a]pparent authority is the power held by an agent
or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties
when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act
on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s
manifestations.”111 Clearly, a person need not actually be an agent to
possess the power of apparent authority. The determination that really
counts in asserting apparent authority is based on what a third party
reasonably believes which is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.112
2. The breadth of the principal’s manifestations to be considered is
illustrated by comment c to Section 2.03 which states in part:
The doctrine stated in this section applies to any set of
circumstances under which it is reasonable for a third party
to believe that an agent has authority, so long as the belief
is traceable to manifestations of the principal. A principal’s
conduct does not occur in a vacuum. A third party’s reasonable
understanding of the principal’s conduct will reflect general
business custom as well as usage that is particular to the
principal’s industry and prior dealings between the parties.
A belief that results solely from the statements or other
conduct of the agent, unsupported by any manifestations
traceable to the principal, does not create apparent authority
unless, as explained below, the agent’s conduct has been
directed by the principal. An agent’s success in misleading
the third party as to the existence of actual authority does
not in itself make the principal accountable.113
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3. The term “manifestations” is defined in section 1.03 of the Restate
ment (Third) of Agency as follows: “A person manifests assent or
intention through written or spoken words or other conduct.”114 The
comments to Section 2.03 explain “manifestations” as:
Manifestations as defined in § 1.03 may take many forms.
These include explicit statements that a principal makes
directly to a third party, as well as statements made by others
concerning an actor’s authority that reach the third party
and are traceable to the principal. For example, a principal
may make a manifestation about an agent’s authority by
directing that the agent’s name and affiliation with the
principal be included in a listing of representatives that
is provided to a third party. The principal may make a
manifestation by directing an agent to make statements to
third parties or directing or designating an agent to perform
acts or conduct negotiations, placing an agent in a position
within an organization, or placing the agent in charge of a
transaction or situation.115
4. The first reporter’s note to Section 2.03 states in part:
In this Restatement, the definition of apparent authority
incorporates by reference the definition of manifestation
in § 1.03. The consequence intended is to eliminate any
inference that, to create apparent authority, a principal’s
manifestation must be directed to a specific third person in
a communication made directly to that person.116

C. Apparent Agency Cases Illustrating Narrow Approaches
Several cases illustrate narrow approaches to what can be regarded as sufficient
evidence of apparent agency to overcome a summary judgment motion.
In Triplett v. Soleil, a husband and wife were plaintiffs on a claim arising
from the husband contracting Legionnaires’ disease allegedly from sources in a
hotel owned by a franchisee of two franchisor defendants.117 The two franchisors
were Sheraton, as to trademarks and logos, and Starwood, as to a reservations
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agreement.118 The court held that to recover against the franchisor(s) under an
apparent agency theory, the plaintiffs would need to prove three elements: “(1) that
Starwood or Sheraton consciously or impliedly represented to [the plaintiffs] that
[the franchisee] acted as their agents; (2) that they relied upon the representation;
and (3) that there was a change of position to their detriment.”119 The franchisors
sought summary judgment on the apparent agency claims.120
Reviewing some of the plaintiffs’ arguments, the court stated:
As to the first element, Plaintiffs argue that Starwood and
Sheraton represented the Hotel as its agent because they were
never made aware of the Hotel’s independent ownership in any
of their dealings with it. Based on previous trips Plaintiffs have
taken, they claim to be aware of the Sheraton and Starwood
brands and first sought information about the Hotel through
Sheraton’s national website found at “www.sheraton.com.”
According to Plaintiffs, nothing on the website indicated that the
Hotel was independently owned and operated. Mrs. Triplett also
contacted the Hotel by telephone, and she was never informed
that Main Street and Soleil Group actually owned and operated
the Hotel. Plaintiffs also contend that the informational packet
they received from Yolanda Patterson, the Director of Catering
for the Hotel, only contained references to Starwood and
Sheraton and failed to disclose Main Street’s ownership and
Soleil Group’s management of the Hotel.121
The court also stated:
As to the second and third elements necessary to establish an
apparent agency, Plaintiffs argue that they reasonably relied
upon these representations in selecting the Hotel as the venue
for Mrs. Triplett’s high school class reunion and would not have
reserved the Hotel for this event had they known the Hotel was
not owned and operated by Starwood and Sheraton.122
The court seemed impressed by the fact that the License and Brand
Agreements required the hotel owner to disclose its independent ownership,
although the court admitted the provisions of the Agreement “do not evidence
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representations made by Starwood or Sheraton, as principals, to the plaintiffs, as
third parties, which is the primary focus when determining whether an apparent
agency relationship exists between a principal and its alleged agent.”123 Still, the
court—stretching its findings and relying on the testimony of an officer of the
franchisors’ quality control firm—inferred that the hotel had complied with the
disclosures required by the License and Brand Agreements.124
The plaintiffs contended that even if a sign about independent ownership
existed, they never saw it, and they never visited the hotel before reserving its
facilities.125 Responding to the plaintiffs’ claims that they had no notice of the
hotel’s independent ownership either in person or from the Starwood website, the
court pointed to the terms and conditions for using the website, which stated:
This web site and the related web sites contained herein
(collectively, the “Site”) make available information on hotels,
resorts, and other transient stay facilities (each a “Property”)
owned, managed or franchised by Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Worldwide, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries and affiliates. While this
language did not specifically state that the Hotel which Plaintiffs
used for the reunion was franchised, the above quoted language
sufficiently represents that not all of the Starwood and Sheraton
brand hotels are owned and managed by them.126
The court also pointed to a business card in an informational packet mailed to
plaintiffs that stated, “albeit in very small type size,” the hotel was independently
owned and operated under a license issued by the Sheraton Corporation.127
Finally, the court summarized its position as follows:
After carefully reviewing the record, the court does not find that
Plaintiffs have submitted evidence sufficient enough to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Starwood and
Sheraton represented to them that Main Street and Soleil Group
had the apparent authority to act as their agents. South Carolina
precedent has refused to find that national advertising and brand
name usage constitute a representation of apparent authority,
and Starwood and Sheraton have provided evidence that several
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placards were displayed throughout the Hotel that disclosed
the Hotel’s independent ownership. Moreover, the ‘Terms and
Conditions’ of Starwood’s website and the business cards used by
the Hotel’s employees expressly represented to Plaintiffs, as well
as other potential guests, that certain hotels operating under the
Starwood and Sheraton brand names are independently owned
and that the Hotel in question was one of them. Therefore,
Starwood and Sheraton are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ claims that Main Street and Soleil Group acted as their
apparent agents.128
Thus, the law of South Carolina, as characterized above, restricts the concept
of apparent authority by excluding evidence clearly relevant to the apparent
agency determination. Moreover, the court otherwise resolved fact issues about
apparent authority in an exceptionally narrow and unconvincing manner.
In another case, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, the Florida Supreme Court
established a factual presumption without expressing any evidentiary basis for
its position.129 The court used this presumption to bar an apparent agency claim
against Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) at the summary judgment stage.130
In Mobil Oil, the plaintiff entered a Mobil Mini Mart gas station owned
by Mobil but leased to an individual who was also a Mobil franchisee.131 One
of the franchisee’s employees attacked and beat the plaintiff, who subsequently
sued Mobil on an apparent agency claim.132 The court explained apparent agency
principles as follows:
In cases of alleged apparent agency, something must have
happened to communicate to the plaintiff the idea that the
franchisor is exercising substantial control. Our law is well settled
that an apparent agency exists only if each of three elements are
present: (a) a representation by the purported principal; (b) a
reliance on that representation by a third party; and (c) a change
in position by the third party in reliance on the representation.133
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The court applied those principles plus its presumption to bar plaintiff ’s suit
as follows:
It is the first of these elements that is primarily relevant here.
The factual allegations in the complaint below clearly fail to
allege even the minimum level of a “representation” necessary
to create an apparent agency relationship. The plaintiff below
alleged no genuine factual representation by Mobil, but merely
assumed that such a representation is implicit in the prominent
use of Mobil symbols and products throughout the station and
in the provision of support activities. As noted above, such an
assumption is not sustainable in today’s world. Unless properly
amended, the complaint below clearly fails to state a cause of
action against Mobil.134
The presumption of what is “well understood” about franchises in today’s
world is evidently the following:
We find Bransford’s allegations legally insufficient to plead a case
against Mobil. In today’s world, it is well understood that the
mere use of franchise logos and related advertisements does not
necessarily indicate that the franchisor has actual or apparent
control over any substantial aspect of the franchisee’s business
or employment decisions. Nor does the provision of routine
contractual support services refute this conclusion. Here,
the contract itself expressly stated that [the franchisee] “is an
independent businessman, and nothing in this contract shall be
deemed as creating any right in [Mobil] to exercise any control
over, or to direct in any respect, the conduct or management of
[the] business.”135
Thus, without indicating any evidentiary basis, the Court assumed a degree
of sophistication and knowledge on the part of customers about the roles of
the various actors who are advancing the business interests of each other and
their enterprises as well as the nature of franchising in general and this franchise
in particular. Such an assumption is not a reasonable or appropriate basis for
summary judgment.
In Allen v. Choice Hotels, a hotel guest sued individually and as a wrongful
death heir of her husband for his death and her injuries allegedly sustained during
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a struggle with robbers in their hotel room.136 Among the defendants was the
hotel franchisor that sought and won a summary judgment in its favor on all
claims.137 The court referred to Mississippi cases finding vicarious liability where
“a party holds itself out as offering services to the public and . . . consumers are
reasonably led to believe that they are doing business with that party . . . .”138 The
court favored the franchisor, however, stating it required the franchisee to display
a sign in a prominent location in the hotel lobby indicating an independent party
operated the hotel. “Therefore, Choice did not lead the public to believe that
customers were doing business with Choice.”139 This language of the court appears
to bar an apparent agency claim from prevailing because of a simple finding that
the franchisor required a sign in the lobby.
Such an approach is unduly narrow in making the apparent agency
determination; surely, an agreement between a franchisor and franchisee requiring
a lobby sign cannot be conclusive. Courts should still need to determine if and
where the sign was placed, and even when such signs are present, courts should not
presume the signs are sufficient to overcome the impact of other apparent agency
manifestations. Such manifestations (including the franchisee’s use of franchisor
logos and trademarks, the franchisee’s inclusion on the franchisor’s website, the
franchisee’s use of the franchisor’s uniform building and product requirements,
etc.) may cause a customer to reasonably believe she is dealing directly with
the franchisor.
Using summary judgment to reject a plaintiff ’s apparent agency claim against
a franchisor because of a disclaimer in a lobby, or because certain manifestations
traceable to the franchisor or franchisor requirements are excluded from the
“holding out” determination, violates the spirit and letter of what is “apparent”
to a third party for agency law purposes. The spirit and letter are further violated
when a court creates an unsupported conclusive presumption, as in the Mobil
case, that customers in “today’s world” possess a sophisticated understanding
of franchise relationships.140 Cases taking such a narrow view of “holding out”
manifestations are refusing to apply reasonable apparent authority or apparent
agency principles in franchisor cases.

D. Apparent Agency Cases Illustrating Broader Approaches
In contrast to the narrow approaches to apparent agency taken by cases
considered in the previous subsection are the broader approaches illustrated by
cases in this subsection. As an example the Miller case, discussed above, is truer
136

942 So. 2d 817, 819–20 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
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Id. at 820.
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Id. at 827 (quoting Fruchter v. Lynch Oil Co., 522 So. 2d 195, 200 (Miss.1988)).
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to the manifestation and reasonable belief requirements of apparent agency.141
Similarly, in Butler v McDonald’s Corp., a federal district court dealing with the
application of the apparent agency doctrine to a franchisor stated, among other
things, that it would require the plaintiff to prove the franchisor acted in a manner
that would lead a reasonable person to conclude the operator and employees of
the franchise restaurant were employees or agents of the defendant.142 The court
approvingly discussed the Miller approach:
The [Miller] Court described examples of defendant’s behavior
that could lead a reasonable person to believe that the franchise
restaurant was an agent of the defendant franchisor. These
included all means and methods that would maintain an “image
of uniformity” among all of defendant’s restaurants, including
“national advertising, common signs and uniforms, common
menus, common appearance, and common standards.”143
In Butler, the plaintiff raised arguments that mirrored the reasoning in the
Miller case:
Plaintiff argues that defendant encourages third persons to
think that they are dealing with defendant when they visit one
of defendant’s franchised restaurants. This belief stems from a
customer’s difficulty in differentiating between a restaurant that
is corporate-owned from one which is franchised. Plaintiff points
to defendant’s national advertising campaign, highly visible logos
throughout the restaurant and on food packaging, a requirement
that the employees wear uniforms of designated color, design
and other specifications, and volumes of required standards
with respect to nearly all aspects of the franchise restaurant’s
maintenance, appearance, and operation. Seemingly, the
purpose of defendant’s mandatory procedures and requirements
for the appearance and operation of franchised restaurants is to
promote uniformity in both product and environment.144
The Butler court held that the plaintiff produced enough evidence to support
the view that a reasonable person would conclude the operator and, or, employees
of the franchise restaurant were employees or agents of the franchisor defendant.
Thus, the court held the issue of apparent agency constituted a jury question.145
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See generally supra notes 90–95 and 97–106 and accompanying text.
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The court also concluded there were jury questions as to what the plaintiff
actually believed:
[P]laintiff has indicated that he simply went to the franchise
restaurant because he and his friends wanted “McDonald’s” food,
as they had done on numerous occasions. Nowhere does plaintiff
indicate that he did or could differentiate a franchised restaurant
from a corporate-owned restaurant. Therefore, whether plaintiff
actually believed that the franchise restaurant operator and/or
his employees were agents of defendant is a question of fact best
left for trial and resolution by the jury.146
Finally, the court likewise held that the question of whether the plaintiff
relied to his detriment upon the care and skill of the allegedly negligent operator
and/or employees of the restaurant presented a factual issue.147 Thus, the
Butler court found issues of material fact with respect to all three prongs of the
apparent agency inquiry and denied the franchisor’s (McDonald’s) motion for
summary judgment.148
Lopez v. El Palmar Taxi, Inc., a 2009 Georgia case, involved a passenger injured
in a traffic accident who sued a taxi company seeking to impose liability for a
driver’s alleged negligence.149 Although the driver was an independent contractor
and not an employee of the company, the Court of Appeals of Georgia found that
a genuine issue of material fact, regarding whether the driver was the apparent
agent of the company, precluded summary judgment.150
In Lopez, the plaintiff contended that the El Palmar company should be held
liable for negligence by the driver because it held its drivers out to the public as
employees by advertising in the local phone book and by using business cards
bearing the company’s, not the driver’s, name.151 The court cited the doctrine of
apparent agency and Section 267 in holding that a party may prove a claim of
agency through evidence of circumstances, apparent relations and the conduct of
the parties.152 Discussing the circumstances of the instant case, the court observed:

146
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See generally id. at 64, 66–67.
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676 S.E.2d 460, 462 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).

150

Id.

151

Id. at 464.

152
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El Palmar does not dispute that it advertised its taxi services
in the local telephone book. El Palmar also had business cards
bearing the company name that were made available to the
drivers to give to passengers. Further, El Palmar admitted that
[the plaintiff ] “called El Palmar Taxi seeking a taxi to pick her
up” and that a taxi displaying its own El Palmar logo picked up
[the plaintiff ] and her children.153
The court also referred to language from a concurring opinion in another case
stating “[in] many instances, passengers undoubtedly choose to ride in cabs
apparently owned and operated by established companies because they assume
that such cabs are safer and more reliable than cabs wholly owned and operated
by individual drivers.”154 The court stated, “[v]iewing the undisputed facts in the
light most favorable to [the plaintiff ] . . . , we conclude that the existing record
does not show that El Palmar was entitled to summary judgment.”155
In Thomas v. Freeway Foods, a race discrimination action under federal
law, the court looked to North Carolina law in deciding that the question of
an apparent agency relationship between the franchisee (Freeway Foods, Inc.)
and the franchisor (Waffle House, Inc.) precluded a summary judgment in favor
of the latter.156 The court explained the apparent agency issues as follows: “To
establish liability based on apparent agency, ‘a plaintiff must show that (1) the
alleged principal has represented or permitted it to be represented that the party
dealing directly with the plaintiff is its agent, and (2) the plaintiff, in reliance on
such representations, has dealt with the supposed agent.’”157
In finding the plaintiffs’ evidence was sufficient to support submission to the
jury on the theory of apparent agency, the court said:
Plaintiffs point out that, with the exception of the signs,
Freeway Foods’ Salisbury Waffle House represents itself to the
public in exactly the same way as Waffle House owned and
operated restaurants . . . Plaintiffs, here, point out that the
Waffle House name and mark appear throughout the Freeway
Foods’ restaurant, from the exterior signs to the menu, the
employees’ uniforms and name tags, and multiple interior
signs. Additionally, Plaintiffs point to the Waffle House website,
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www.wafflehouse.com, which provides a store directory of all
Waffle House restaurants that does not distinguish between
Waffle House owned restaurants and those that are franchised.158
Waffle House argued there could be no finding of apparent agency because
of signs in the restaurant announcing that Freeway Foods was the operator and
franchisee. The court refused to accept the position that the signs would bar the
apparent agency claim:
While each party argues about the significance of the signs,
there has not been sufficient evidence presented at this stage of
the proceeding to support a ruling as a matter of law. There are
still open questions about the size and placement of the signs in
relation to customers and whether most customers would likely
have seen them and, thereby, have understood that the restaurant
was neither owned nor being operated by Waffle House.159
The court also felt the evidence presented by plaintiffs on the reliance prong
of the apparent agency test was sufficient, saying:
Plaintiffs explained that they chose to go to the Salisbury Waffle
House because they saw the sign the night before and recognized
it as a restaurant chain where they had eaten at before and enjoyed
the food. Additionally, Ms. Thomas testified that because of her
health requirements, she chose to go to Waffle House because
she “could get food cooked the way she needed.” . . . Finally,
Ms. Willis, Mr. Willis and Ms. Thomas all stated that if they
had known that the Waffle House was owned and operated by
another party they would not have decided to eat there. Thus,
Plaintiffs’ reliance on their previous experiences with Waffle
House restaurants played a large role in their decision to eat at
the Salisbury restaurant.160
In Miles v. Century 21, a 2007 federal district court decision, the plaintiffs, an
African-American couple serving in the U.S. Air Force, claimed that a franchisor,
Century 21 Real Estate, LLC (Century 21), was vicariously liable for violations
by a franchisee, to which the court referred as Century 21 Cabot, of federal and
state anti-discrimination laws. 161 The alleged violations occurred in connection
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Ark. Jan. 11, 2007).
161

2013

A Rush to (Summary) Judgment

247

with the plaintiffs’ efforts to lease a house in Arkansas.162 The court denied
Century 21’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ apparent
agency claim.163
In denying the motion, the court cited with evident approval the following
legal analysis:
To apply the doctrine of apparent agency to a franchisor/
franchisee situation, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the
franchisor acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that the operator and/or employees of the
franchise were employees or agents of the defendant; (2) that the
plaintiff actually believed the operator and/or employees of the
franchise were agents or servants of the franchisor; and (3) that
the plaintiff thereby relied to his or her detriment upon the care
and skill of the allegedly negligent operator and/or employees of
the franchise. Examples of a franchisor’s behavior that could lead
a reasonable person to believe that a franchisee is an agent of the
franchisor include all means and methods that would maintain
an image of uniformity among all of the franchises, including
national advertising, common signs and uniforms, common
menus, common appearance, and common standards.164
Among the factors the court considered important to include in explaining its
determination are the following:
In support of their assertion that the doctrine of apparent
agency applies in this case, Plaintiffs submit the deposition
testimony of Mr. Thomas Kunz, the President and Chief
Executive Officer of Century 21 Real Estate LLC, where he
states that Century 21 is the “most recognized real estate sign
in the world,” and the logo, as a brand, “conveys . . . some kind
of minimum expectation that we would -- that a consumer
would expect to received [sic] from anybody that would have
that brand.” Plaintiffs also argue that Ms. Shown, the owner of
Century 21 Cabot, states that when she purchased Century 21
Cabot, she received “[g]oodwill. I got a nationally recognized
company name.” Plaintiffs state that the Century 21 logo,
marks, name, and symbols are used extensively by Century 21
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Id. at *26 (quoting 62B Am. Jur. 2d, Private Franchise Contracts § 300) (internal citations
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Cabot, and Century 21 provides precise specifications for the
use of its proprietary marks.”165
Also of particular significance to the court’s apparent agency disclaimer
analysis was the following:
Plaintiff Joseph Miles also states that he did not observe
the disclaimer that each office is “independently owned and
operated” on the sign in front of the house, Ms. Ward’s business
card, or in the Century 21 Cabot office, but even if he had
observed such a statement, he does not understand the legal
consequences of such a statement.166
This forthright admission of the plaintiff about a lack of understanding points
not merely to his own subjective belief, but raises a general question about the
degree of sophistication which customers are expected to have when a technical
disclaimer is used to rebut impressions created by other representations.
A recently decided case, Ross v. Choice Hotels International, Inc., illustrates
a realistic approach by the court in denying defendant franchisor’s motion for
summary judgment.167 In Ross, plaintiffs were not allowed to use the room they
rented at a Comfort Suites East Hotel in Ohio as they wished. They left the
hotel and were denied a refund. They sued Choice Hotels International, Inc.
(Choice), franchisor of the hotel, as well as the hotel franchisee and management
companies. Among the plaintiffs’ claims were those filed against Choice on the
basis of Ohio apparent agency law for unlawful discrimination under federal
and state statutes.168 In denying a summary judgment motion by Choice, the
court held inter alia that plaintiffs’ apparent agency claim was worthy of jury
consideration.169 In reaching this decision the court reviewed plaintiffs’ suggestion
that a reasonable jury could find on the evidence before the court that Choice
permitted the franchisee and management companies to hold themselves out
to the public as acting on behalf of Choice, that plaintiffs believed they were
interacting with Choice and that plaintiffs had good faith reasons to believe
the franchisee and management companies had the authority to act on behalf
of Choice.
The court noted that plaintiffs submitted the franchise agreement and rules
indicating Choice’s requirements mandating the franchisee to “use Comfort
Suites signage and logos inside and outside the hotel” and also noted “the Choice
165
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directory and website listings as identifying the hotel only as a Comfort Suites
Hotel.” 170 (The court raised the possibility that only the former contention
presented much relevance regarding plaintiffs’ perceptions and reliance since the
evidence indicated only that they saw the signage and logos inside and outside
the hotel). The court also noted that plaintiffs contended they went to the hotel
because of the Comfort Suites sign visible from the road, they did not know the
hotel was independently owned, the employee they dealt with wore a Comfort
Suites uniform and their receipt bore the Comfort Suites logo.171
Citing several cases the court stated that “[p]ersuasive authority supports the
denial of summary judgment based on such facts given that a jury could rely on
them in finding apparent agency.” 172
The court acknowledged Choice’s argument that it did not hold out the
franchisee and management companies as its agents but they held themselves out,
but the court responded: “What Choice Hotels does not credit is that reasonable
inferences suggest that Choice Hotels enabled if not actively endorsed such
holding out; that is the point of apparent agency, or agency by estoppel.”173 To
the court’s view of the franchisor as the possible enabler or active endorser of the
holding out, there should be added the possibility that at times a franchisor not
only enables or endorses but also actually requires the holding out.
At this point, it is well to consider hospital liability cases, which accept a
possible and not unreasonable interpretation of the principles of apparent agency
(referred to as apparent authority) in tort cases. Although these cases do not
involve franchisor-franchisee relationships, the principles of apparent agency
applied in these hospital cases may logically be applied to other apparent agency
determinations, including those in franchise cases. Of course, some courts may
reject the position of these hospital liability cases or distinguish franchise cases in
some way.
In Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hospital, the estate and husband of a deceased
patient sued a hospital alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of an
anesthesiologist.174 The plaintiffs contended that the hospital was liable under
a theory of apparent authority.175 The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim
because of the absence of evidence that the hospital actively held out the doctor
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involved as its agent or misled the patient about his agency.176 On appeal, the
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court rejected the trial court’s
position.177 The appellate court’s discussion of apparent authority in the context
of the hospital cases makes the following points:
1. Liability could be imposed on the principal because of its somehow
misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the
authority exists.178
2. Apparent authority is demonstrated when the hospital by its actions
held out a person as its agent and/or employee and the patient
accepted treatment in the reasonable belief that it was rendered on
behalf of the hospital.179
3. A hospital can hold out a doctor as its agent without actively
misrepresenting the agency or affirmatively misleading the patient,
such as where the hospital provided doctors to treat an emergency.180
4. Holding out is determined by considering the totality of the
circumstances created by the hospital’s actions.181
5. Consideration of the entire course of conduct and the impression
it would convey to a reasonable patient in the same situation is
consistent with Section 2.03 182 and section 429 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (Section 429).183
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Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (2006) (“Apparent authority is the power held
by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third
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traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”).
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6. A principal may manifest assent to the agency by placing a person in a
position from which third parties will infer that the principal assents
to acts necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of the position.184
The court also noted that the patient must accept the agent’s service
reasonably believing that it is rendered on behalf of the principal.185 As to this
point, by making the following statement, the court noted its view of a changed
reliance requirement:
There is a notable difference between sections 2.03 and 429 and
the standard for apparent authority provided in section 267 of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958), which includes
an element of reliance. Reliance is an element of apparent
authority under sections 2.03 and 429 only to the extent that
it is subsumed in the requirement that the person accepting an
agent’s services do so in the “reasonable belief ” that the service is
rendered in behalf of the principal.
The elements of agency by estoppel also differ from the elements
of apparent authority stated in sections 2.03 and 429. Agency by
estoppel requires proof of detrimental reliance.186
Obviously, the court does not exclude facts from the “totality of circumstances”
or create artificial impediments in determining the presence of “apparent author
ity” in the same manner displayed at times in franchise cases discussed earlier.
In another hospital case, Jones v. TVH, the Idaho Supreme Court succinctly
stated the case required it “to consider whether a hospital can be found vicariously
liable for the negligence of an independently contracted cell saver technician
under Idaho’s doctrine of apparent agency.”187 Preferring to use the term apparent
authority instead of apparent agency, the court held “that a hospital may be
found liable under Idaho’s doctrine of apparent authority for the negligence of
independent personnel assigned by the hospital to perform support services.”188
In so holding, the court cited sections from the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and the Restatement (Third) of Agency:
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Under section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
liability is imputed to a principal “who employs an independent
contractor to perform services for another which are accepted in
the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the
employer or by his servants . . . .” 189 When determining liability
in a situation such as this when an agency relationship is alleged,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts defers to the Restatement of
Agency.190 Section 2.03 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency
defines “apparent authority” as “the power held by an agent or
other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties
when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to
act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the
principal’s manifestations.”191
Citing the Cordero case explanation of the reliance requirement of Section
2.03 and contrasting reliance requirements of Section 267 and agency by
estoppel, section 2.05 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency (Section 2.05), the
court concluded that “under the Restatement (Third) of Agency, [the] plaintiff is
only required to prove reasonable belief rather than justifiable reliance, to satisfy
a claim of apparent authority.”192 The courts’ references to estoppel in Cordero
and Jones are noteworthy because of the possible use of the estoppel doctrine in
franchisor cases.
Section 2.05 provides for estoppel as follows:
A person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has
authority as an agent and who is not otherwise liable as a party
to a transaction purportedly done by the actor on that person’s
account is subject to liability to a third party who justifiably is
induced to make a detrimental change in position because the
transaction is believed to be on the person’s account, if
(1) the person intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or
(2) having notice of such belief and that it might induce others
to change their positions, the person did not take reasonable
steps to notify them of the facts.193
189
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Those courts not satisfied that a franchisor’s manifestations establish apparent
authority may be willing to accept Section 2.05 as a basis of franchisor liability
where the latter’s responsibility is based on the estoppel doctrine. Comment d to
Section 2.05 states in part:
Apparent authority is not present unless the third party’s belief
is traceable to the principal’s own manifestations, which may
include placing the agent in a position that leads third parties to
believe the agent has authority consistent with the position.194
Estoppel does not require as close a fit between affirmative acts
of the principal and the third party’s belief. Instead, it protects
third parties who reasonably believe an actor to be authorized as
an agent when the belief cannot be shown to follow directly or
indirectly from the principal’s own manifestations.195
As to the detrimental change of position requirement of Section 2.05,
comment b states: “‘Detrimental change of position’ means an expenditure of
money or labor, an incurrence of a loss, or subjection to legal liability, not the loss
of the benefit of a bargain.”196
Suppose a driver patronizes a well-advertised fast food restaurant because of
confidence in the members of the franchise family created by publicity as well
as good experience at other establishments with the same name. Suppose she
suffers an injury because of a foreign object in her hamburger. Could she prevail
under an apparent authority (or apparent agency) or estoppel approach? Could
a franchisor walk away from responsibility to the victim who may be unable to
recover her loss because of a judgment proof franchisee? Should the franchisor be
allowed to escape responsibility for an injury caused by careless food preparation
or in a fall down case because of careless floor cleaning? To what extent should a
patron be able to look to a perceived enterprise for redress when she later learns
that her perception was wrong?
A court that takes a narrow approach to what is apparent authority, because
of a strict view as to what constitute manifestations by a principal, may be open
to estoppel liability, which does not require as close a fit between the principal’s
affirmative acts and the third party’s belief. It would appear that the detrimental
change of position requirement would encompass the results to the tort victim.
Questions of law and policy need to be addressed forthrightly in dealing
with franchisor cases. In many situations, the franchisor with its knowledge and
power is in a good position to promote safety and the financial responsibility
194
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of franchisees. Furthermore, customers often are understandably misled into
thinking that they are involved in transactions with franchisors. Courts must
determine the proper legal rules to encourage appropriate behavior by franchisors
and franchisees. Courts must address summary judgment motions based on
application of appropriate principles to properly determined facts. Alleged factual
determinations that lack reality undermine the important requirement that
persons can rely on courts to dispense impartial justice. If the apparent agency
doctrine is properly applied to the case facts and this leads to results unacceptable
to courts, then they must bravely face the need to alter the applicable doctrine.

IV. The Impact of the Restatement of Torts on Franchisor
Liability Cases—Apparent authority
As indicated above, there are cases that have used Section 267 as a basis
for apparent agency claims against franchisors for physical harm torts caused
by franchisees.197 Section 7.03 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency expressly
allows for apparent authority tort claims on a limited basis and does not refer to
liability from torts of non-agents.198 This section does not seem designed to cover
or impact on the viability of the kind of claims formerly brought under Section
267 against franchisors.
The recent hospital liability cases, discussed above,199 interpret the Restatement
changes as enhancing physical harm claims against apparent principals under
apparent authority, Section 2.03, which has changed the reliance requirement. In
addition, Section 2.03 applies to both agent and non-agent conduct.200 Arguably,
claims against franchisors could be reasonably pursued under apparent authority
Section 2.03 as analyzed in Cordero and Jones, the hospital liability cases.
Moreover, support for physical harm claims against persons who hire
independent contractors who appear to be their employees exists under section
65 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts Tentative Draft (Section 65)201 as successor
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See generally supra Section III at notes 174–96 and accompanying text (discussing Cordero
and Jones cases).
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See generally supra Section III at notes 174–96 and accompanying text (discussing Cordero
and Jones cases).
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to Section 429.202 As indicated above, both the Cordero and Jones cases refer to
Section 429. In addition, the reporters’ notes to Section 65 cite the Cordero case
in explanation of the section. Furthermore the comment b to Section 65 states:
The rule in this Section . . . can be viewed as an application
of the principle of apparent authority in contexts involving
physical harm caused by an independent contractor. Apparent
agency can be established by any set of circumstances under
which it is reasonable for a third party to believe that the person
has authority to act for another, so long as that belief is traceable
to manifestations by the other. This section specifically requires
that the actor hire an independent contractor to perform services,
and that these services be accepted in the reasonable belief that
the hirer or the hirer’s employees are providing the services.203
Finally, the comments to Section 65 contain the following illustration:
Molly’s brother, Charlie, faints. Molly hails a taxi, whose labeling
indicates that it belongs to Clement Taxi Company. However,
under the driver’s arrangement with Clement Taxi Company,
the driver is an independent contractor. Molly helps Charlie into
the taxi and accompanies Charlie in the taxi as they head to the
doctor’s office. As a result of the taxi driver’s careless driving, the
taxi collides with another car, driven by Paul. Molly, Charlie,
and Paul are all injured. Clement Taxi Company is subject to
vicarious liability to Molly and Charlie, but not to Paul.204
For courts seeking American Law Institute guidance in franchisor apparent
authority cases involving physical harm torts, Sections 2.03 and 429, and Tentative
Draft Section 65, whether directly or by analogy are valuable.

V. Franchisor Torts—Direct Liability
Until now, this article has focused on franchisor liability for franchisee
torts. In contrast, this section deals with the direct liability of a franchisor for its
own torts.

(b) the independent contractor’s negligence is a factual cause of harm to one who
receives the services and such harm is within the scope of liability.
Id. cmt. a (“This section carries forward the principle contained in Restatement Second,
Torts § 429.”).
202

203
Id. cmt. b (referring to Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 cmt. c (2006)) (internal
citation omitted).
204

Id. cmt. e, illus. 4.
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As with vicarious liability, control issues may be central in direct liability
cases. Thus, negligent selection by the franchisor of items the franchisee will use
may lead to direct liability. For example, in Whitten v. Kentucky Fried Chicken
Corp., the court referred to the franchise agreement requiring the franchisee
to use equipment approved by Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. (KFC) for the
preparation of chicken.205 A franchisee employee injured in the use of a fryer sued
the franchisor and others who allegedly approved its design.206 The trial court
granted a summary judgment in favor of the franchisor, concluding, inter alia,
that it owed no duty to the plaintiff.207 The appellate court cited section 414
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
[O]ne who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but
retains control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for
physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a
duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to
exercise his control with reasonable care.208
The court explained it was for the trier of fact to determine to what extent the
franchisor was able to control the operations of the franchisee and such control
must consist of something more than a general right to make suggestions or
recommendations or to order work stopped or resumed.209 The court concluded
that summary judgment was not appropriate because the instrumentality
alleged to have caused the injury was one purchased with the approval if not at
the direction of the franchisor.210 Furthermore, the court pointed to questions
of material fact as to the degree of control or direction KFC retained over the
equipment purchased by its franchisees and the franchise operation as a whole.
The Whitten court also proceeded with a different theory under section 324A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts dealing with “Liability To Third Person
for Negligent Performance of [an] Undertaking.” 211 The court stated that a jury
could find KFC undertook to recommend or select a safe fryer for the use of
employees of its franchisee and increased the risk to the plaintiff due to its failure
to exercise reasonable care.212 The court also stated that the jury could find KFC
undertook to perform a duty owed by the plaintiff ’s employer to the plaintiff, i.e.,

205

570 N.E.2d 1353, 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).

206

Id.

207

Id. at 1355.

208

Id. at 1356 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965)).

209

Id.

210

Id. at 1357.

211

Id.

212

Id.

2013

A Rush to (Summary) Judgment

257

the recommendation or selection of safe equipment that employees would use.213
Additionally the court found that the franchise contract provided for the right
to inspect to determine compliance with contract specifications, that KFC had
exercised that right of inspection, and that therefore issues of fact needed to be
resolved regarding liability under section 324A of the Restatement.214
The importance of franchisor control was also clear in Kosters v. The Seven-Up
Co.215 In that case, a purchaser of soft drinks who was injured when a bottle
slipped from its carton brought an action against the soft drink franchisor that
had the right of control over the carton design.216 The court found the case had
been properly submitted to the jury on both negligence and breach of implied
warranty theories.217
Another type of franchisor control issue may arise from involvement in
franchisee operations. In Allen v. Choice Hotels, a federal court pointing to South
Carolina law held that a hotel franchisor did not owe a duty to hotel guests to
direct the franchisee to retrofit hotels with sprinklers.218 The court set forth an
interesting comparison between vicarious and direct liability analyses which
turned upon franchisor control, saying: “Like the vicarious liability analysis, the
‘[d]irect liability cases [also] look to the franchisor’s actual control or retained
right of control to determine the presence of a duty for purposes of evaluating
whether the franchisor was itself negligent.’” 219
The Allen court found neither the “Franchise Agreement” nor the “Rules and
Regulations” established sufficient control to create a franchisor duty to hotel
guests.220 The court also reviewed the issue of whether the franchisor, Choice
Hotels, (Choice), owed a common law duty of care to foreseeable persons.
Rejecting that position, the court found Choice did not create a risk or make
injury to hotel guests more likely.221 Additionally, although the court recognized
a duty under South Carolina law to use due care where an act is voluntarily
undertaken for the benefit of a party, the court felt unable to find there was such
an undertaking by Choice.222
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In Braucher ex rel Braucher v. Swagat, a hotel guest and the estate of a deceased
guest filed a negligence action against a hotel franchisor and franchisee alleging
the guests became ill with Legionnaires’ disease following a stay at the franchised
hotel.223 The plaintiffs’ expert opined that if the defendants had performed their
obligation to maintain the pool and spa, the plaintiffs would not have contracted
the disease.224 Among its findings, the court held that the franchisor neither
exercised sufficient control over the franchisee to be subject to a duty as an
operator of the hotel nor voluntarily assumed a duty to maintain the pool and
prevent infection.225 However, the court made the important statement that the
face of an agreement is not controlling on the issue of duty because a franchisor
may assert sufficient control of a hotel to be responsible for the operation of the
pool and spa.226
In another case illustrating the importance of the control issue, Vaughn v.
Columbia Sussex, the plaintiff asserted that she fell on a hotel lobby’s wet floor
while walking to a meeting with hotel management.227 She brought a negligence
claim against the franchisor, Holiday Inn, and its franchisee.228 Holiday Inn moved
for a summary judgment, arguing as a matter of law it bore no liability, because
“liability in tort ‘cannot be ascribed in the absence of ownership or authority
to remedy an alleged situation.’” 229 Holiday Inn claimed it had “no authority”
to remedy the situation involved in the case.230 The court referred to New York
law, under which “‘[l]iability for a dangerous condition on property is predicated
upon occupancy, ownership, control, or a special use of such premises.’” 231 The
court pointed to the franchisor’s license agreement with the franchisee, which
guaranteed substantial control by the franchisor.232 The court indicated that the
franchisor was involved in the training of hotel employees and the construction
of the hotel, that the franchisor could inspect the hotel at any time, and that
the franchisor could order upgrading and rehabilitation pursuant to its own
standards.233 Although there were not yet enough facts to determine whether the
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franchisor was liable to the plaintiff, the court stated that on a summary judgment
motion the plaintiff need not make such a showing.234
Persons involved in the negligent creation of dangerous or defective
conditions on property, even if not owners or possessors, may incur liability.
In Walsh v. Super Value, Inc., a defendant, who was the owner of a Texaco gas
station and convenience store, leased the premises to another defendant that ran
the business.235 The owner and the lessee agreed to convert the Texaco station
to a Shell station.236 The conversion required repainting several areas of the
station including the curb outside the convenience store in accordance with
requirements specified by Shell Oil Company and Shell Oil Products Company,
LLC (referenced collectively as, Shell).237 Upon leaving the store, a customer
slipped on the painted curb and sustained injuries.238 She filed suit against the
aforementioned defendants and Shell, among others, claiming the paint on the
curb created a dangerous or defective condition.239 Relying on rules of liability
pertinent to an owner’s creation of a dangerous or defective condition, the court
rejected Shell’s motion for summary judgment, even though Shell was not an
owner of the property.240 The court spoke of the duty of an owner to maintain the
premises in a reasonably safe condition.241 The court held:
[A]n owner should be held liable for the creation of a dangerous
or defective condition on property if a reasonable person in the
owner’s position would have known, or would have had reason to
know, of the danger created, or would have had such knowledge
imputed by operation of law.242
Spring Tree Properties, Inc. v. Hammond also illustrates the vulnerability of a
franchisor arising from the condition of the enterprise premises.243 In that case,
the driver of a van approaching a Hardee’s restaurant inadvertently stepped on her
accelerator while attempting to park in a head-in parking space located directly
in front of the restaurant.244 The van ascended the curb and hit the plaintiff,
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who was exiting the restaurant.245 Among the defendants were the franchisor
(Hardee’s) and its franchisee.246 The plaintiff alleged they had breached their
duty of care by failing to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition;
specifically, by failing to prohibit parking directly in front of the restaurant door,
failing to provide an adequate barrier between the restaurant’s front parking
spaces and the front doors, failing to install vertical bumper posts in front of the
restaurant’s front parking spaces, failing to install wheel stops in the restaurant’s
front parking spaces, failing to provide a reasonably safe entrance/exit, failing to
remedy a foreseeably unsafe condition, and failing to provide signs warning of
unsafe conditions.247
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hardee’s and its
franchisee.248 The intermediate appellate court reversed, and the Florida Supreme
Court agreed that summary judgment was not appropriate, finding the record
contained sufficient evidence to justify a reasonable person believing that the
defendants breached their duty of care and that the breach was the proximate
cause of the injury suffered.249 The Florida Supreme Court, while not relying on
it as a reason for overturning the summary judgment, made clear that it would
have been erroneous for the trial court to conclude Hardee’s did not have a duty
to protect the plaintiff from the specific harm involved in this case.250
It is evident from the discussion in this section that franchisor direct tort
liability may arise in various ways. Indeed, issues of franchisor control or behavior
with respect to operations or real and personal property involved in the franchised
enterprise are key to determining such liability.

VI. Conclusion
Summary judgment is a powerful tool, appropriate when no issue of material
fact is presented.251 Yet, in granting summary judgments favorable to franchisors,
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courts in franchisor liability cases sometimes engage in questionable judicial fact
finding. Some courts have made unconvincing assumptions and assessments about
franchisor control that need to be considered more carefully and realistically.
Moreover, mere clever labeling and drafting in documents should not preclude
inquiry by counsel and courts into the fundamental issue of the reality of control
in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. Where plaintiffs pursue apparent agency
or estoppel claims, dismissing their cases because of premises signs, web site
notices, or the like may be inappropriate in the face of the other manifestations
to which they have been subjected. After all, customers patronizing franchised
businesses lack the sophistication, time or information to negate the powerful
impression made by franchisor publicity before they buy their sandwich or register
at a hotel. Injured plaintiffs and franchisor defendants should expect realism and
not generalized, arbitrary rules in the factual assessment of their positions. Nor is
the exclusion of relevant evidence of franchisor manifestations, such as national
advertising, appropriate. Obviously, respect for courts is undermined by improper
fact finding.
Guidance by analogy or otherwise from agency or tort principles and the
underlying policies they serve is reasonable in franchisor liability cases. As courts
settle upon applicable legal doctrines for franchisor liability, a vitally important
policy consideration is the extent to which tort responsibility will encourage
franchisors to emphasize health and safety considerations that would prevent
injuries, thereby benefiting individuals and society.

